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Abstract 
 
We analyse the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in developed economies. We compare between 
EU and non-EU countries, in the context of an estimated equation derived from 
economic theory, which compares the main demand and supply-side determinants of 
FDI. We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, by employing different 
proxies for demand and supply-side factors. Second, by comparing between European 
and non-European developed countries. Third, by testing for the relative importance 
of total factor productivity (TFP) as a determinant of FDI. Our results are in line with 
theoretical predictions, but point to the importance of TFP as the determinant par 
excellence of FDI in developed countries. They also highlight differences even within 
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I) Introduction 
 
During the 1990’s, foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) grew at a faster rate than incomes and trade (Hill, 2009). This 
growth and the anticipated potential beneficial effects on growth and development, 
especially of developing and emerging economies have led to attempts by 
governments to devise policies that attract FDI. It has also renewed discussion and 
research on the determinants of FDI. An important question in this context is whether 
such determinants differ between countries.  
Our aim in this paper is to test the above hypothesis by focusing on developed 
OECD countries and by comparing between European and non-European countries. 
In particular we use as a basis a model by Head and Mayer (2003), which accounts for 
both demand and supply-side factors, but test it for the two different sets of countries 
and by employing different proxies for the generic cost and demand-side variables the 
authors derive. Our results are in line with the theory, but also point to important 
differences between the two sets of countries, as well as between different proxies for 
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II) Theoretical Foundations of FDI and the MNC  
 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) can be defined as incorporated or 
unincorporated enterprises that comprise parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates 
(UNCTAD 2007). A parent company is defined as an enterprise that controls assets of 
other entities in countries other than its home country, usually by owning an equity 
stake. An equity stake of 10 per cent or more of the shares or voting power for an 
incorporated enterprise is normally considered as a threshold for the control of assets, 
or its equivalent for an unincorporated one.  The definition of what constitutes FDI, as 
opposed to other capital flows, follows from the above convention. For example, 
UNCTAD (2007) considers FDI to involve equity capital, the reinvestment of 
earnings and the provision of long-term and the short-term intra-company loans 
between parent and affiliate enterprises.  
MNCs pursue profits by implementing a strategy of internationally seeking 
enhanced differentiation and reduced costs (Caves, 1997). To achieve this, they place 
different stages of production, or the production of part of the same product, in 
various countries according to the costs and the availability of inputs, which are most 
critical for the respective stage of production or the kind of the product. For example, 
the production of a relatively labour-intensive good will be undertaken in a country 
with relatively cheap labour, whereas the production of a relatively capital- or 
technology-intensive good will be undertaken in a country with relatively high-
specialized labour, developed infrastructure and agglomeration economies (unit cost 
economies resulting from the concentration of economic activities).  
Stephen Hymer (1960) was the first economist who considered FDI as the 
defining feature of the MNC and tried to explain it in terms of its relative advantages 
vis-à-vis other forms of foreign operations. The first reason to explain why firms 
favour FDI to alternative modalities such as licensing or cooperation, Hymer 
suggested, was the reduction of rivalry in international markets. A second reason was 
that FDI allowed firms to better exploit their monopolistic advantages. A third was the 
diversification of risk. MNCs can be horizontally integrated, vertically integrated 
and/or diversified (Caves, 1997). Horizontally integrated are enterprises producing the 
same group of outputs irrespectively of the geographic market. Vertically integrated 
are enterprises, which use some of their partner firms, or as Caves refers to “plants”, 
to produce commodities that serve as inputs for other activities. Hymer also claimed   5
that “the strength of a multinational enterprise stems from the fact that it can trade 
knowledge internally more quickly than two firms which have to negotiate conditions 
each time” (Hymer 1968, pp. 23). Overall, Hymer concluded that “multinational firms 
are better institutions than international markets for stimulating business, transmitting 
information and fixing prices” (Hymer 1968, pp. 17). 
Post-Hymer theories such as Buckley and Casson (1976) and Williamson 
(1986) focused on the internalisation of advantages and claimed that internalisation 
reduces transaction costs when assets are intangible or specific to the investments 
made. Resource-based and evolutionary theories such as Teece (1981) and Kogut and 
Zander (1993) claimed that MNCs may be superior to markets in transferring tacit 
(non-codifiable) knowledge (Dunning and Pitelis, 2008). 
The most widely known general framework that aims to the existence and 
growth of MNCs or FDI is the OLI paradigm, (also known as eclectic), developed by 
John Dunning (1995). Dunning argued that the existence and growth of MNCs is the 
result of the simultaneous combination of three sets of advantages relative to other 
firms, the advantages of Ownership, Location and Internalisation, (also referred to as 
the OLI tripod, Eden, 1991). Ownership advantages are mainly intangible knowledge-
based assets and advantages of oligopoly. Knowledge advantages can be patents, 
brand names, marketing and managerial skills, product innovations and process 
enhancements. Oligopoly advantages include economies of scale and scope, private 
access to resources and first mover advantages. Internalisation advantages arise from 
the avoidance of exogenous imperfections of markets faced by MNCs. Exogenous 
imperfections can be divided into two categories; those that are intrinsic to some 
markets and to those that are generated by state actions. The former arise from the 
existence of transaction costs, uncertainty and the public good aspect of knowledge in 
foreign markets. State-induced imperfections include tariffs, foreign exchange 
controls and subsidies. The internalisation of markets is a vehicle that the corporation 
can employ to substitute an external or missing market with an internal one and thus 
to overcome market failures. Locational advantages determine the countries in which 
the MNC chooses to produce. They can be divided into economic, social and political. 
Economic advantages refer to a country’s factor endowments for example its capital, 
labour, managerial skills, technology and natural resources, as well as its 
transportation and communications, infrastructure and its market size. Social or non-
economic advantages (or disadvantages) include the language, ethnicity, business   6
customs and culture of different countries. Finally, political advantages include the 
government’s attitude towards MNCs and certain policies, such as trade barriers and 
investment regulations that may affect FDI (Eden, 1991).   
In Dunning’s OLI paradigm ownership and internalisation advantages do not 
determine the location in which the firm will invest. Location, like structure, is part of 
a strategy, meaning that the region chosen by the MNC depends on the strategic role 
that the plant will play within the enterprise. The reasons that MNCs go abroad are 
numerous but can be classified into three main categories; securing natural resources, 
reducing costs and gaining access to foreign markets (Eden, 1991). The locational 
decisions of an MNC as to where it should set up its plant depends on the nature of 
the investment, in other words if it is resource-seeking, cost reduction or market 
access. Consequently, the MNCs’ locational structures depend on the strategy 
followed and can be of three forms. In the case of resource-seeking, strategic 
investments plants can be either extractors, (in which case they collect and secure raw 
materials), or processors, which turn raw materials into fabricated ones. In case of 
cost reducing strategic investments, plants can be either offshores or source factories. 
The former make use of cheap local inputs, such as relatively low unit labour costs, to 
produce intermediate goods that are exported back to the MNC for further assembly. 
Source factories enable access to low-cost inputs and produce subcomponents that are 
sold to the parent firm for their usage in the production of the final goods. Although 
they are both used for sub-assembly, source factories have higher level of 
technological activity than offshores (ibid, 1991).  
Affiliates that correspond to market access strategic investments can be 
importers, local servers, focused factories, or miniature replicas or lead factories or 
outposts, depending on their level of technological activity, with the last mentioned 
having the higher. Early Japanese investments in Europe were mainly importer 
factories. Local servers sell output to local markets and are used for the production of 
subcomponents for domestic sale. Focused factories specialise in mass production of 
one to maximum two lines of products to be sold in the domestic and open market. 
Miniature replicas are set up by the MNC for the production and sales of a full range 
of products, being very similar to the parent firm. They constitute a strategy by MNCs 
to overcome host country trade barriers. The development of new technologies and 
products for global markets is a responsibility of lead factories, which are similar to 
the parent firm. Finally, outposts are R&D intensive investments designed from the   7
MNC to act as a window to technology in technology innovations and accumulate 
knowledge across nations (Eden, 1991). 
Location-Specific determinants of FDI can be divided into two categories, the 
Hierarchical-Related Advantages and the Alliance or Network-Related Advantages.  
These may favour home or host countries (Dunning, 1995). The Hierarchical-Related 
Advantages include the spatial distribution of natural and created resource 
endowments and markets, input prices, quality and productivity, such as labour, 
energy, materials, components and semi-finished goods, international transport and 
communication costs, investment incentives and disincentives (including performance 
requirements, etc.) and artificial barriers, for example import controls to trade. 
Moreover, societal and infrastructure provisions (commercial, legal, educational, 
transport and communication), cross-country ideological, language, cultural, business, 
political, etc. differences, economies of centralization of Research and Development 
(R&D) production and marketing and lastly, the economic system and policies of 
government, particularly the institutional framework for production and resource 
allocation.  
Advantages of agglomeration arise essentially from the presence of a portfolio 
of immobile local complementary assets, which, when organized within a framework 
of alliances and networks, produce a stimulating and productive industrial 
atmosphere. The extent and type of industrial districts, science parks and the external 
economies they offer to participating firms are examples of these advantages, which 
over time may allow foreign affiliates and cross-border alliances and network 
relationships to better tap into, and exploit, the comparative technological and 
organizational advantages of host countries. Networks may also help reduce any 
information asymmetries and the likelihood of opportunism in imperfect markets. 
They may also create local institutional thickness, “intelligent regions” and social 
embeddedness (Amin and Thrift 1994, Dunning 1995, pp. 476).  
It is also possible to classify the location-specific determinants of FDI into 
supply-side and demand-side ones (or factor-oriented and market-oriented variables 
respectively). The main supply-side variables are the labour costs, capital costs and 
tax rates whilst the demand-side variables include mainly the market size and its rate 
of growth (Head and Mayer, 2003).    
FDI has the potential to affect economic growth through multiple channels, 
such as capital formation, increases in employment and productivity, technology   8
transfer and spillovers, human capital (skills and knowledge) enhancement, and 
increase exports and the long-term economic performance of countries (Ozturk 2007, 
UNCTAD 2007). More than ever, countries at all levels of development seek to 
leverage FDI for development. Foreign affiliates of around 64,000 multinational 
corporations generate 53 million jobs. Moreover, FDI is the largest source of external 
finance for developing countries. In 2005 developing countries´ inward stock of FDI 
accounted for about one third of their GDP, compared to just 10 per cent in 1980. 
Notably, one-third of global trade is intra-firm trade (UNCTAD, 2007).  
The potential impact of FDI on the host countries is very important for policy 
makers, who wish to know whether to try to attract FDI or not, and if so, what type of 
FDI, as well as the relationship between FDI and trade, for example exports in this 
context. Gast and Herrmann (2008) focused on the identification of the factors that led 
to the worldwide increase of FDI during the 1990s and also, they addressed the 
question whether these determinants influenced exports in a different way. They used 
data from 22 OECD countries. They estimated gravity models for bilateral FDI 
stocks/flows and exports, firstly in a cross-section setting for 1999 and then as a panel 
data set for the period 1991-2001. Analysing the panel results they found that a 
change in total market size is an important characteristic that leads both FDI and 
exports in the same direction. Relative market size affects only exports significantly. 
In addition, stock market booms boost FDI but not exports. The political indicators 
and exchange rate changes suggested that exports are demand-driven whereas FDI is 
supply-driven. They concluded that “FDI and exports tended to flow relatively less 
abundantly to distant countries than to nearby countries over the period under 
consideration. This supports the idea of a complementary relationship between 
investment and trade” (Gast and Herrmann 2008, pp. 1). 
Markusen and Venables (1998) examined two ways through which FDI might 
affect host countries, through its effects on local firms in the same industry; product 
market competition and linkage effects. The former constitutes the channel through 
which MNCs can substitute for domestic firms and the latter is the channel through 
which MNCs can be complementary. They showed that it is possible for FDI to act as 
a catalyst, leading to the development of local industry, which may in turn become 
strong enough, so as to reduce both the relative and absolute position of MNCs in the 
industry. They supported their claims with case study literature from South East Asian 
economies. Furthermore, they argued that competition in the product and factor   9
markets will lead to reduced profits of local firms, which however can be substituted 
through the linkage effects to supplier industries that may decrease input costs and 
this way raise profits. They established circumstances in which FDI is complementary 
to local industries and they illustrated how FDI might lead to the establishment of 
local industrial sectors. They pointed that such sectors may develop to the extent that 
local production overtakes and forces out FDI plants. Concluding, they claimed that 
their results were consistent with experience.   
Li and Liu (2005) conducted a panel investigation of 84 countries, both 
developed and less developed ones, during the period 1970-1999 to examine the 
effects of FDI on economic growth. They found that there is a strong correlation 
between FDI and economic growth from the mid 1980’s onwards. They argued that 
FDI not only promotes economic growth directly, but also does so indirectly, through 
its interaction with human capital. However, they also highlighted a significant 
negative correlation between the interaction of FDI with the ‘technology gap’ and 
economic growth. From their empirical analysis they concluded that inward FDI is 
attracted to recipient countries with a large market size. Additionally, they highlighted 
the importance of human capital and ‘technology-absorptive’ capabilities in 
promoting economic growth in less developed countries. On this basis, they derived 
policy implications that involve the promotion of human capital and technological 
capabilities, which will lead to increased FDI inflows and in turn to further economic 
growth and enhanced competitiveness (Li and Liu, 2005).   
Busse and Groizard (2006) explored the linkage between income growth rates 
and FDI inflows. They argued that countries need a sound business environment in 
the form of good state regulations to be able to benefit from FDI. Using a 
comprehensive data set for regulations, they tested this hypothesis and found 
indications that excessive regulations can constrain the economic growth that FDI can 
generate only in the most regulated economies. They concluded “Any attempts by 
government to attract capital in the form of foreign direct investment by offering special 
tax breaks are not likely to yield the expected beneficial effects if the regulatory quality is 
rather low. In addition to increasing educational attainment levels and boosting the 
regulatory quality and liquidity of financial markets, host countries have to reform their 
fundamental framework for regulations” (Busse and Groizard, 2006).  
Ozturk (2007) conducted an extensive review of the literature of the effects of 
FDI on growth. He characterized the overall evidence as mixed as regards the   10
importance of labour costs, openness, investment climate, developed vs. developing 
countries and fiscal incentives. However, he concluded that “free trade zones, trade 
regime, the human capital base in the host country, financial market regulations, 
banking system, infrastructure quality, tax incentives, market size, regional 
integration arrangements and economic/political stability” are very important 
determinants for FDI that create a positive impact on overall economic growth 
(Ozturk 2007, pp. 79).   
  Even within developed economies it is possible that the degree of economic 
development and/or other factors, such as the their geography/location, influence the 
determinants of FDI. Mold (2003) conducted an econometric analysis with a sample 
of developed European countries, which grouped into ‘core’ ones (Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom) and ‘peripheral’ ones, (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) examining the 
FDI outflows of United States manufacturing affiliates into the aforementioned 
countries. He observed that only market growth potential and exchange rate 
variability were significant, followed by the relative unit labour costs. He concluded 
that factor-related characteristics, such as the local cost of capital, did not seem to 
influence the locational choices of US MNCs but rather the market-related variables 
play the primary role. Moreover, his study showed that the growth rate of real FDI 
inflows was much higher in the peripheral countries than in the European centre (63 
versus 31 per cent). He claimed that this could be a result of European Union’s 
investments in infrastructure and market liberalisation in the transport sector, thus a 
reduction in transaction costs within its borders. Moreover, in per capita terms, 
smallest European countries, such as Luxemburg, attracted higher levels of US FDI in 
the manufacturing sector.  
Wheeler and Mody (1992) examined three variables, previous investment, 
infrastructure and the level of industrialization, and found them all to be significant 
and positive. Woodward (1992) supported these results with an econometric analysis 
showing that Japan’s outward FDI was drawn to regions with high present 
manufacturing activity.  
Further studies suggest that tax rates may be significant for attracting FDI by 
MNCs. Although the relationship between FDI and interest rates is not clear, in 
principle if the host country has relatively higher interest rates this will deter firms 
from investing in expansions of local capital markets and this may subsequently lead   11
to an increase in FDI. On the other hand, if the host country has much higher interest 
rates than the international market, (an implication of an unstable economy) this will 
reduce FDI (Mold, 2003). Culem (1988) estimated a model concerning US FDI in the 
EEC, in which the nominal interest rate differential between the host country and the 
international market was positively signed and found that higher interest rates in the 
host country may attract FDI inflows. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2001) who examined 
separately nominal and effective tax rates found a consistently significant and 
negative relationship between taxation and FDI inflows, irrespectively of the tax 
form.  
  Pye (1998) conducted a survey with a sample of 334 firms from the main 
European and North American countries in terms of investment into the Czech 
Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary between 1989 and 1996. He found 
that the leading drive in 34 per cent of the sample was market size and its growth 
potential. Further research suggests that 116 West European firms planning to operate 
in one of sixteen CEECs share as their primary motive the size of the market, with the 
exception of Hungary and Czech Republic, where political and economic stability 
were the dominant factors to attract investment flows (Lankes and Venables, 1997). 
Moreover, Poland’s size and homogeneity of its market, and its relatively higher 
personal incomes seemed to be the major factors attracting FDI. The latter applies for 
the Czech Republic and Hungary, which along with Poland have the highest personal 
incomes in the district. Additionally, Altzinger (1999) found that among 150 Austrian 
firms investing in CEECs, those specializing in finance and insurance, food and 
beverages and construction considered market potential to be the most significant 
factor. Meyer (1996) examined 267 British and German companies that invest 
primarily in Hungary, which mainly emphasized on the purchasing power of the 
consumers. Also, the market size in terms of population size that could be a way to 
proxy expected market growth seemed to be a most important factor for attracting 
FDI. Market size and growth were the primary motive for market-oriented MNCs.   
  Factor costs seem to be important as well, as MNCs do seek lower wage costs. 
Pye (1998) found that financial efficiency factors account for 10 percent of the 
secondary determinants for enterprises. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia labour 
cost advantages were the primary motives for investors although elsewhere market 
potential seemed to be the leading factor. Lankes and Venables (1997) indicated that 
production costs and cheap qualified labour are of high significance for export-  12
oriented enterprises. In addition they showed that transport costs are significant for 
heavy industry. Factor costs were proved to be important in Poland too, especially in 
earlier years. Furthermore, according to Altzinger (1999) Austrian firms view lower 
unit labour costs as an advantage, especially in the engineering sector where it seems 
to be the most significant one, but of almost inexistent one in the financial and 
insurance industrial sectors. Meyer (1996) observed that a skilled labour force is the 
leading factor for attracting FDI in Hungary, particularly for assemblers and domestic 
supply oriented exporters. This does not seem to be the case for non-exporters. The 
recent evidence on the determinants of locational choices by MNCs are summarised 
by Boudier-Bensebaa (2005).  
Despite extensive research on the determinants of FDI, there is no research 
that tests for the impact of the same determinants between different types of 
developed counties, such as European and non-European countries of the OECD. 
There are various reasons why there could be important differences, not least because 
of the existence of regional blocks, such as the EU, the role of location and 
geography, the proximity of the EU countries to the newly emergent of the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, it appears worth separating European 
from non-European developed OECD countries. In addition, theoretical models 
usually come-up with genres of FDI determinants, which could be proxied by 
different variables. Here we employ different proxies for supply-side and demand-
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III) Model, Data, Estimated Equation and Econometric Results 
 
Head and Mayer (2003) developed a mathematical model to examine the 
profitability of a location to a prospective investment company. Their model is is 
attractive in that it accounts for both demand and supply-side factors, hence our 
selection of it as a basis. Note, however, that other models come up with similar 
predictions, so our results are more representative, see Faeth (2009) for a recent 
summary of the empirical evidence, which also points to this conclusion. Head and 
Mayer’s approach consists of deriving first the demand equation for consumers, firms 
and individuals, as follows,  
qij  = (pij
-σ  /  Σr=1
R  nr  p
1-σ
rj)*Ej, where Er,  represents the expenditures in a specific 
industry in region r. Consumers allocate their expenditures in variations of the product 
in the specified industry. The authors assume that both firms and individuals to have 
constant elasticity of substitution sub-utility functions for each industry and maximise 
it subject to expenditure Er  and the delivered prices from all R possible product 
origins. Consumers face the delivered price Pij in region j, the host destination, for 
products from region i, the home country. On this basis, they derive the profit 
function in each destination region j for a firm producing in region i as  
πij = (pi – ci) τij qij = {(ci τi)
 1-σ /σGj}*Ej. After mathematical manipulations, including 
the subtraction of the fixed costs and the inclusion of Mr, the ‘Krugman market 
potential’ (Mr) (Krugman, 1992), they obtain  
Ur  = {lnσ + ln (Πr + F)} / σ-1 = - ln cr + (σ – 1)
-1 ln Mr. This “expresses the 
profitability for a firm of locating in region r as a very simple function that is 
decreasing in production costs and increasing in the Krugman market potential term” 
(Head and Mayer 2003, p.6). Finally, by using labour at cost wr, ‘other inputs’ like 
land and intermediates at cost vr, a as labour’s share and Ar, which represents total 
factor productivity they conclude in  
Ur = -a ln wr + (σ-1)
-1 ln Mr – (1 – a) ln vr + ln Ar.  (1) 
In their econometric analysis the authors derive the estimated equation   
Ur = Vs + Wr + ξr, where Vs denotes the nation-state variables, independent across 
nations, Wr  the region-state variables and ξr that the remaining non-observable 
random variation. Hence, Vs includes national policies, such as corporate tax rates, Wr 
includes wages and market potential and ξr is a random term that acts as a shock to 
lnAr that is specific to firm-region pairs.    14
  In what follows we use this model as a basis, but test it for two sets of OECD 
countries, EU and non-EU. We include different proxies for demand and supply-side-
related factors, in order to test for any differences on their impact on FDI. We also test 
the model with or without total factor productivity as an independent variable for 
reasons explained below.   
We use panel data, ‘cross-sectional time-series’. Our dataset covers seventeen 
developed OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, and United States) for the period 1972 to 2000. The choice of countries and 
period was determined by data availability. There are thirteen European countries and 
four non-EU member countries. The total number of observations is 493 and the panel 
variable is strongly balanced. We use six variables, foreign direct investment inflows 
(FDIIN) (dependent variable), GDP per capita (GDPPC), real unit labour cost 
(RULC), firms’ gross operating surplus (profits) (GOS), total factor productivity 
(TFP), the gap between actual and trend GDP (Y-Ytrend)/Ytrend (GAP) and 
corporate tax rate (TAX). These are described in Appendix 3. From these variables 
GDPPC and GAP are proxies for the demand-side variables, while GOS and TFP for 
the supply-side (see below). TFP stands as a proxy for the overall strength of the 
domestic economy, including its innovation system and agglomeration effects 
(Krugman 1994, Porter 1990). TAX aims to capture specific tax policies by countries 
that aim to attract FDI.   
The estimated equation in its general form is as follows: 
FDIit = a0 + a1 GDPPCit + a2 RULCit + a3 TFPit + a4 GAPit + a5 GOSit + a6 TAXit + uit 
where i refers to the 17 host countries of the OECD to the period 1972-2000 and u is 
the error term, which is assumed to satisfy the usual conditions. GDP per capita is the 
gross domestic product divided by the population and captures the effect of market 
size and consumer power on the investment decision. In addition, it represents the 
economy’s demand. GOS is the gross output minus total costs, more specifically, the 
gross operating surplus adjusted for imputed compensation of self-employed. It 
depicts the economy’s profits and is a proxy for the country’s general business 
environment. Total factor productivity can be seen as a proxy for the overall 
efficiency of the economy.  It can also be seen as a proxy to agglomerations, which 
may result in external economies that reduce unit costs and increase productivity. The 
second variable, RULC, captures the differences in factor costs, in particular the   15
relative unit labour costs, in the different countries examined. The variable GAP 
represents the gap between actual and trend GDP as a percentage of trend GDP. It is 
used to capture ‘Krugman’s market potential’. Finally, TAX depicts the highest 
corporate tax rate in each country.  
  In our regression analysis we use random and fixed effects models. The reason 
for this is that the variables are not independent of the error term and by using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model we would have biased estimates. By fitting the 
fixed-effect or random-effect model, the fixed or random individual differences can 
be controlled. Fixed effects regression is the model to use in order to control for 
omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over time. It gives the 
option to use the changes in the variables over time to estimate the effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable, and is the primary technique used 
for analysis of panel data. This way dummy variables are generated for each of the 
cases (in this analysis the countries) and by including them in a standard linear 
regression we can control these fixed ‘case effects’ see Data and Statistical Services 
(DSS), (2007). It is appropriate for this analysis as there are relatively fewer cases and 
more time periods, 17 countries compared to 29 years period of time, (as each dummy 
variable removes one degree of freedom from our model). In case some omitted 
variables are constant over time but vary between cases, and others are fixed between 
cases but vary over time, then we can include both types by using random effects. 
Stata’s random-effects estimator is a weighted average of fixed and between effects. 
The way to choose between fixed and random effects is running a Hausman test. 
Statistically, fixed effects always give consistent results but random effects give better 
P-values, as they are a more efficient estimator. The Hausman test checks a more 
efficient model against a less efficient but consistent model to ensure that the more 
efficient model will also give consistent results (DSS, 2007). Therefore, it is used to 
decide whether we should use the random or fixed-effects model. 
Overall, we ran three regressions for all OECD countries, three for European 
countries and three for the non-European countries. We used the logarithmic values of 
the variables as the aforementioned model suggests. The results obtained for all 
OECD countries using the random effects model as the Hausman test suggested 
(p=0.1663), show that only the lnTFP was significant at the 1 percent level. The least 
significant variable was GAP. In the case of Europe the Hausman test was significant 
with p value equal to 0.0335, at 5 percent, and thus, we used the fixed effects model.   16
Both lnGDPPC and lnTFP were found significant at 5 percent level of significance. 
Lastly, in the case of non-European countries, where we also used the fixed effects 
model (p=0.0383), lnTFP was found significant at 1 percent and lnGOS at the 5 
percent one.  Both in European and non-European countries GAP was the least 
significant factor.    
  In terms of method, we used the ‘general to specific’ modelling (Wojciech W. 
Charemza and Derek F. Deadman, 1997). This requires that “starting from a general 
dynamic statistical model, which captures the essential characteristics of the 
underlying data set, standard testing procedures are used to reduce its complexity by 
eliminating statistically insignificant variables and to check the validity of the 
reductions in order to ensure the congruency of the model. As the reduction process is 
inherently iterative, many reduction paths can be considered, which may lead to 
different terminal specifications. Encompassing is then used to test between these, 
usually non-nested, specifications, and only models, which survive the encompassing 
step, are kept for further consideration. If more than one model survives the 
"testimation" process, it becomes the new general model, and the specification 
process is re-applied to it” (Hans-Martin Krolzig and David Hendry 1999, p.1). In this 
case we first eliminated the lnGAP variable, which was the least significant. Using the 
same model for each group respectively, in the general regression, lnTFP remained 
the most significant determinant at 1 percent level of significance. In the case of 
Europe, lnGDPPC and lnTFP remained significant with minor changes in their p 
values and lnTFP and lnGOS for non-European countries. 
  In the last category of regressions we excluded total factor productivity, as this 
is strongly correlated with unit labour costs (TFP reduces unit labour costs), but also 
because of its potentially unique importance as an overall measure of the health of an 
economy. The results obtained using the same model led to lnGDPPC being 
significant at 1 percent, lnTAX negative and significant at 1 percent, lnRULC 
negative and significant at 5 percent and lnGOS negative and significant at 10 percent 
for all OECD countries. For European countries, lnRULC was significant at 5 percent 
and all other variables were significant at 1 percent with p values equal to 0.000 and 
for non-European countries, lnRULC and lnGOS were significant at 5 percent and 
lnGDPPC and lnTAX at 1 percent.  
  Our results are of interest. They first show that once supply-side factors such 
as TFP are considered, demand-side considerations become unimportant for   17
developed countries as a whole. This seems to be consistent with the idea that in 
developed countries it is the overall efficiency of the economy, as captured by TFP 
that matters. This overall result however, seems to hide differences between the two 
types of countries. While in European countries both TFP (supply-side) and GDPPC 
(demand-side) were significant, in non-European countries only supply-side factors 
were significant (TFP and GOS). Another interesting observation concerns the critical 
role of TFP, which seems to dominate all other factors that acquire importance only in 
its absence (with the exception of GDPPC in Europe). This is in line with and 
supports arguments by Krugman (1991, 1994) and others on the critical role of TFP, 
especially in developed economies.          
    
  
IV) Conclusion and policy implications  
In conclusion, we analysed the determinants of FDI in developed OECD, 
European and non-European countries. Following a discussion of the theoretical 
foundations, we examined a model developed by Head and Mayer (2003), which 
highlights some rather generic determinants of FDI, and used different measures as 
proxies for supply and demand-side factors. Our results highlighted the critical role of 
TFP as a determinant of FDI in developed countries. We also identified some 
differences between European and non-European developed countries, as well as 
factors other than TFP that influence FDI in these groups of countries. In terms of 
policy implications that follow from our results, countries interested in attracting FDI 
should focus on policies that improve the overall business climate, firm profitability 
and importantly the overall productivity of the economy.  Tax policies and demand 
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Table 1. Variables contained in the dataset 
Variables Description  Source 
FDIIN  Foreign direct investment inflows (US 
dollars) 
UNCTAD (undated) 
GDPPC  GDP per capita (constant 1995 US dollars)  AMECO (2005) 
RULC  Real unit labour cost index: total economy 
(1995=100) 
AMECO (2005) 
GOS  Gross operating surplus adjusted for imputed 
compensation of self-employed: total 
economy (millions of 1995 US dollars) 
AMECO (2005) 
TFP  Total factor productivity  AMECO (2005) 
GAP  Gap between actual and trend GDP at 1995 
market price as percentage of trend GDP. (Y-
Ytrend)/Ytrend 
AMECO (2005) 
TAX  Highest Corporate tax rate  World  Tax  Database 
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Appendix 2 
Table 2. Coefficients and p values for all OECD countries 
 
       lnfdiin |        Coef.          P>|z|      
      lngap1 |     .0452294      0.729     
    lngdppc |    -.9617021      0.351     
     lnrulc1 |     -1.627661      0.708     
         lntfp |      12.97459      0.000      
      lngos1 |      .2224283      0.388     
         lntax |    -.8566307       0.327     
       _cons |     -32.22295      0.325     
 
       lnfdiin |      Coef.         P>|z|      
     lngdppc |  -1.006227     0.294     
       lnrulc1 |  -1.507609     0.724    
          lntfp |   12.97932     0.000    
        lngos1 |   .2444934     0.305    
          lntax |  -.8298365     0.332    
         _cons |  -32.56863     0.310   
 
     lnfdiin |         Coef.          P>|t|      
   lngdppc |     8.342187      0.000      
     lnrulc1 |       -8.9352      0.032     
      lngos1 |   -2.648698      0.060     
         lntax |   -2.329601      0.004     
       _cons |   -11.03671      0.712      24
Table 3: Coefficients and p values for Europe  
 
      lnfdiin |      Coef.           P>|t|      
      lngap1 |  -.2007114      0.572      
    lngdppc |   34.96531       0.013      
     lnrulc1 |    16.40516      0.368    
         lntfp |   -58.74093      0.034     
      lngos1 |    3.150075      0.634     
         lntax |  -.1730125      0.969     
       _cons |   -172.9521      0.211    
 
      lnfdiin |      Coef.   .         P>|t|      
    lngdppc |    31.52518       0.017      
      lnrulc1 |    21.91331       0.195     
          lntfp |   -57.70971      0.029     
        lngos1 |    5.201979      0.397    
          lntax |   -.9241214      0.830    
        _cons |   -178.6053       0.180   
 
       lnfdiin |       Coef.          P>|z 
     lngdppc |    -12.2488      0.000     
       lnrulc1 |  -23.93084      0.016     
        lngos1 |   1.800828      0.000      
          lntax |   -12.29617      0.000     
         _cons |    276.3697      0.000     
   25
Table 4: Coefficients and p values for non-European OECD countries 
 
      lnfdiin |      Coef.           P>|t|      
      lngap1 |   .0840974      0.558     
    lngdppc |   1.918122      0.571     
     lnrulc1 |  -4.595563       0.347     
         lntfp |   15.82113       0.010      
      lngos1 |  -3.293685      0.028     
         lntax |  -.9995903      0.282     
       _cons |  -41.04894      0.235     
 
      lnfdiin |      Coef.          P>|t|      
    lngdppc |   2.374869      0.466     
     lnrulc1 |    -4.53192      0.344     
         lntfp |   15.66903       0.010      
      lngos1 |  -3.394708      0.018     
         lntax |  -.9849291      0.279     
       _cons |   -44.65345     0.183      
 
      lnfdiin |      Coef.          P>|t|      
    lngdppc |    8.749839     0.000      
     lnrulc1 |   -10.44642     0.015     
      lngos1 |   -2.835531     0.048     
         lntax |   -2.161201    0.007     
       _cons |   -8.182241     0.790     
 